What’s Behind Saudi Arabia’s Connection to Islamic State?
By
Ben Rich | July 29, 2015
Last Updated: July 29, 2015 10:37 am
Let me get this straight. The state amplifies threats to its "society" so that the government can get easy support of terrible policies that work against the people, further in support of the government further feeding the Government { the state was creating demand for its own rule.} But the Government often uses religion to do this and then when the government does non- religious actions, the people get upset and need an outlet to let off their anger.
{States commonly construct threats of
external war and terror in order to gain domestic power. A byproduct of
such activities has often been the rise of destructive exclusivist
nationalism and xenophobia.}
{The logic
dictated that their existence necessitated a higher authority to
moderate society and ensure the correct Islamic form was maintained.}
Ironically, for Saudis this arrangement has meant that the state has
been a prominent promoter of the “innovation” so detested in classical
revivalist thought creating the monsters that need an outlet for their Patriotic, nationalist - religious fervor.
A
file photo of Saudi royal guards on duty in front of portraits of
former King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz (R), new King Salman bin Abdulaziz
(C), and former Crown Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz (L) in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia. (Fayez Nureldine/AP)
Many claim that the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Group is one of patron and
client. ISIS, they argue, is a pawn of the Saudi regime, used to check
the “rising” Shiite power of Iran in the Middle East.
This allegation typically presents certain shared principles between
the official Saudi interpretation of Islam and the doctrine motivating
ISIS as damning evidence of complicity between the two.
Although there is a certain truth to this, it assumes a willful
agency on Saudi Arabia’s part that simply isn’t there. Saudi citizens
supporting ISIS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a
coherent plan directed by the kingdom’s rulers, but the overflow of a
long-standing system used to maintain its domestic legitimacy.
Saudi citizens
supporting ISIS’s activities in Iraq and Syria are not the result of a
coherent plan directed by the kingdom’s rulers, but the overflow of a
long-standing system used to maintain its domestic legitimacy.
Evolution of State Control
The Saudi state has relied on the ultra-conservative Wahhabi movement since both emerged in the mid-18th century.
Wahhabism was built on the desire to stamp out religious innovation
and restore the “proper” Islam. Its initial power rested on two
sources—the common distaste among the inhabitants of Central Arabia for
such innovation and preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s ability to
channel this grievance into a populist doctrine.
The call produced something never encountered before in the region: a proper mass movement.
The Saudis, a small clan of oasis nobility, formed a symbiotic
relationship with Wahhab. It lent him military support in return for the
movement’s resources and legitimacy. Wahhab agreed to defer all matters
of state and politics, restricting clerical activities to administering
the social and metaphysical spheres.
As “guardians” of Islam, the Saudis were able to differentiate
themselves from their local competitors. Revivalism attached a mass
appeal to their mission of conquest in an environment typified by
disparate local identities and “petty sheiks.” The resultant state came
to be viewed as key to safeguarding the Wahhabi community, a central
factor in its expansion over much of the Arabian Peninsula by the late
19th century.
Realizing the importance of the ongoing ideological support of its
subjects, the Saudi regime sought to instill Wahhabism throughout
conquered territories. The primary motivation for Saudi leaders was
political. By instilling the revivalist identity into greater numbers of
its subjects, the state was creating demand for its own rule.
Key to this effort was the securitization of heterodox sects, such as
the Shiite. These “others” were presented as a threat to the
community’s metaphysical integrity due to their inauthentic practices,
which were not encountered during Islam’s early period. The logic
dictated that their existence necessitated a higher authority to
moderate society and ensure the correct Islamic form was maintained.
This is hardly a novel concept. States commonly construct threats of
external war and terror in order to gain domestic power. A byproduct of
such activities has often been the rise of destructive exclusivist
nationalism and xenophobia.
Where the Saudi state remains novel is in its use of a purely
metaphysical threat, the extent that it has relied on this to maintain
its position, and the longevity of the effort itself.
(TheConversation.com)
Glitches in the System
The state’s arms have commonly been employed to ensure this status
quo. Saudi Arabia’s education system has been criticized for promoting a
radicalizing, sectarian narrative that encourages violence against
those outside the sanctioned community.
But while Saudi Arabia has carefully crafted an image as Islam’s
protector, it nevertheless has aimed to keep policymaking pragmatic, not
ideological. Decisions of economic and foreign policy have tended to be
dominated by technocrats, not clerics. In this, religion is often
invoked, but generally when it is instrumental to a wider political
goal.
Ironically, for Saudis this arrangement has meant that the state has
been a prominent promoter of the “innovation” so detested in classical
revivalist thought.
This tension has occasionally produced outbreaks of violence. The
1927 Ikhwan revolt was sparked in part by King Abd al-Aziz’s refusal to
exterminate the Shiites of al-Hasa and his diplomatic relations with
external “infidel” powers.
Similarly, the 1979 Siege of Mecca was a rejection of the previous
two decades of radical modernization initiated by King Faisal. The 2003
attacks by al-Qaeda inside Saudi Arabia were partially motivated by its
accommodation of “infidels.”
Saudi Arabia’s
education system has been criticized for promoting a radicalizing,
sectarian narrative that encourages violence against those outside the
sanctioned community.
Historically, this blowback has been largely domestic. Only since the
1990s have these types of unintended outcomes been felt
internationally.
This shift can be attributed to several factors. The most prominent
among them was Saudi Arabia’s tacit support for participation in the
Afghanistan wars of the 1980s.
The primary motivation for this was not one of ideology, but
political pragmatism. Saudi Arabia was experiencing an economic downturn
in which household incomes fell by more than half and unemployment
skyrocketed. At the same time, the regime was struggling with a rising
Islamist current in the wake of the Iranian revolution, which was
increasingly calling into question its legitimacy to rule.
With a large number of disenfranchised young men at home, a rival
power walking into a geopolitical bear trap, and a need to appear
increasingly activist to the Muslim community, the decision was aimed at
killing three birds with one stone. Thanks to its strong influence over
domestic Islamic identity, it took little encouragement to mobilize
thousands of young Saudis into a conflict with a new infidel threat.
Although Saudi Arabia began actively discouraging such behavior after
the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the genie had been let out of the bottle.
Saudis continued to flock to “pan-Islamic” conflicts throughout the
1990s and the 2000s—in Kosovo, Tajikistan, Chechnya, Iraq, and, most
recently, Syria. They gravitated toward religiously hardline groups,
whose ideologies meshed well with the sectarian narrative of their
upbringing.
The Saudi regime
created a demand for sectarian confrontation in some people that cannot
be met by the state and which drives them towards radical action.
Treating the Symptom, Not the Wound
While Saudi Arabia has made several attempts to stem the flow of
fighters and finances to groups like ISIS, it has been careful not to
appear overly oppressive for fear of antagonizing its own constituents.
It may decry such groups, but it continues to promote a system that
inadvertently supports them.
Revivalist scholars claim that Saudi Arabia’s doctrine is
intrinsically opposed to the ISIS worldview. They cite esoteric textual
minutiae to support such assertions. But such arguments miss a wider
point: The issues at play are far less about literary nuance than the
wider emotional, psychological, and sociological themes that Saudi
Arabia promotes in its populace.
Such structures created a demand for sectarian confrontation in some
people that cannot be met by the state and which drives them toward
radical action. Until such deeper issues are dealt with, other responses
will merely be token.
Unfortunately, the domestic efficacy of Saudi Arabia’s control means
that it is unlikely to be reformed any time soon. The state’s
manipulation of its population’s sectarianism during the Arab Spring,
for example, was key to its effective management of the 2011 crisis.
Within this wider context, the ruling elite see the extremist habits
of a small number of Saudis as an unfortunate yet tolerable side effect
of a system that has allowed them to remain in power for nearly 300
years.
This certainly does not diminish the Saudi state’s culpability. But
it does pose the question: How does one change an entire system of
popular governance that inadvertently produces such outcomes and appears
structurally incapable of preventing them?
Ben Rich is a Ph.D. candidate at the Monash University. This article was previously published on TheConversation.com
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Epoch Times.
