Editorial: The Chinese Communist Party Has No Way Forward
Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) head Xi Jinping (Right) and Premier Li Keqiang
(Left) wave to guests as they arrive for a dinner marking the 64th
anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China at the
Great Hall of the People on Sept. 30, 2013 in Beijing, China. The two
were responsible for issuing a collection of reforms at the Third Plenum
of the 18th Central Committee, which are meant to rescue the CCP from
crisis. (Feng Li/Getty Images)
The one resource left to the CCP to gain popular support is to appeal to the kind of patriotism based on inciting hatred.
The Chinese Communist Party’s new leadership just had
its best opportunity to extricate the Party from crisis and provide a
sure basis for governing China.
At the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s 18th Central
Committee, which ended on Nov. 12, Party head Xi Jinping and Premier Li
Keqiang put forth a raft of new reform policies, but history will show
these initiatives are too timid to meet the demands of the time.
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang first needed to seize the power once owned
by the faction of Jiang Zemin and transfer it to themselves, and then
they needed to put the policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on a
basis that could command consensus. They made progress on the first
task, but failed in the second, indicating they are not capable of
solving the fundamental problem facing the Party.
After Bo Xilai’s former right-hand man Wang Lijun fled on Feb. 6,
2012, to seek asylum at the U.S. Consulate in Chengdu, the war within
the CCP between the faction loyal to former Party head Jiang Zemin and
the Party’s official leadership broke out into the open.
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang needed to eliminate the institutional basis
of the power Jiang Zemin had wielded behind the scenes for the past
decade. Before Jiang Zemin retired, he had changed the function of the
Politburo Standing Committee from a body that advised the head of the
CCP to one that had a claim to rule in its own right. In doing so, he
put shackles on his successor, Hu Jintao, and Hu Jintao’s premier, Wen
Jiabao.
At the Third Plenum, the Central Committee approved, unanimously of
course, the establishment of a State Security Committee and a Further
Reform Leading Group, to be led by Xi and Li. These new bodies
officially dissolved the power Jiang had conferred on the Politburo
Standing Committee.
Root of the Crisis
Among the long list of reforms published after the Third Plenum
ended, one sees again and again the CCP attempting to deal with the
consequences of persecuting the traditional spiritual practice of Falun
Gong without addressing the persecution itself.
Jiang Zemin launched the campaign to eradicate the practice of Falun
Gong on July 20, 1999, seeking to put an end to individuals doing the
discipline’s meditative exercises and living according to its principles
of truthfulness, compassion, and tolerance.
In a letter Jiang circulated to the Politburo on the night of April
25, 1999, he had complained that the sheer number of Falun Gong
practitioners and the attractiveness of Falun Gong’s teachings to the
Chinese people were a threat to the CCP.
In 1999, 100 million Chinese were practicing Falun Gong. The campaign
of torture and brainwashing Jiang unleashed on these peaceful and
law-abiding citizens directly affected hundreds of millions of people,
when the practitioners’ family members are included.
The great harm Jiang has done—and the refusal of him or his faction
to be held accountable for that harm—is the root of the CCP’s current
crisis.
Judicial Reform
After Jiang Zemin started the persecution of Falun Gong, he created a
legal vacuum. The efforts that had been made to bring the rule of law
to China were shattered in order to remove all barriers to the campaign
against Falun Gong.
Then, the CCP began using the legal methods developed for use against
Falun Gong against the public at large, creating widespread anger and
turmoil.
The key to Jiang’s remaking of the legal system was the role played
by the Political and Legal Affairs Committee (PLAC), which drove forward
the persecution of Falun Gong while holding authority over all parts of
the legal system.
Xi Jinping has already taken several steps to rein in the power of
the PLAC. The new reforms continue the effort to weaken the PLAC by
severing its tie to local courts and procuratorates—the offices
responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes. These institutions
will now be directly governed by the central Party leadership while the
Supreme Court will be in charge of their funding and personnel.
In order to help fund the persecution of Falun Gong, Jiang Zemin put
control of lucrative state-owned enterprises in the hands of cronies. Xi
Jinping and Li Keqiang will now look to wrest control out of their
hands.
Recently, Jiang Jiemin, the former president of the giant China
Natural Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and confident of Zhou Yongkang, a
key player in the Jiang Zemin faction, was removed from his post. The
CNPC is said to have been divided into three companies.
Among the reforms are measures involving land use in rural areas,
where the persecution of Falun Gong is again implicated in creating
difficult problems. The persecution consumes astronomical amounts of
money, and the local governments are saddled with these costs. With the
costs of corruption added on, the local governments are deeply in debt.
Unrestrained by the central authorities, local governments began to
realize enormous profits by seizing land with violence. This has helped
create a real estate bubble and at the same time ignited civil protests
all across China. This situation has forced Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to
draft reforms putting restrictions on the local governments, especially
on their finances.
Moral Foundation
When Deng Xiaoping presented his reforms to the Third Plenum of the
11th Central Committee in 1978, he started by redressing the victims of
the Cultural Revolution and correcting miscarriages of justice. With
these limited moral resources, Deng was able to push his reforms forward
and ensure the CCP could reign for the past 35 years.
A key reform requires consensus within the group. To implement it,
one needs moral authority and the trust of the people. Today’s CCP falls
short on these points.
The CCP’s ideology of Marxism is bankrupt, and communism has become a
joke. Yet there is no other belief tying the CCP together. The
officials and Party members focus on nothing but corruption and
promotion. The Party has tons of factions and no consensus.
In particular, Jiang Zemin’s faction, haunted by the fear of being
held accountable for the persecution of Falun Gong, is doing everything
it can to hinder Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang from enacting reform. Behind
the scenes, Jiang’s faction and Xi are struggling bitterly for power,
and Jiang’s fingerprints are on a number of incidents that have
embarrassed or distracted Xi Jinping.
The one resource left to the CCP to gain popular support is to appeal
to patriotism—the kind of patriotism based on inciting hatred. Loving
China means hating the United States or Japan. Building up such
patriotism means tearing down relations with other countries. In an age
of globalization, such a strategy will inevitably recoil back on China.
At the same time, for today’s CCP officials to appeal to patriotism
is a farce. Many representatives of the Chinese regime’s national
legislature and elite advisory body—the National People’s Congress and
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference—hold dual
citizenship. China’s wealthy have been emigrating, and top officials
have sent their wives, children, and money overseas, while themselves
keeping a foreign passport. In this situation, the appeal to patriotism
is worse than meaningless.
Prior to the Third Plenum, the top Party officials reiterated the
importance of the policy of “two will-nots”: The Party will not correct
the mistakes made in the first 30 years (1949–1979) and will not
acknowledge the mistakes made in the second 30 years (1979–2009).
The CCP has ruled for over 60 years. It has killed 80 million Chinese
and persecuted hundreds of millions. The persecution of tens of
millions of Falun Gong practitioners is still ongoing. The “two
will-nots” abandons the idea of exposing and criticizing Jiang Zemins’s
evil crimes.
By again asserting the policy of “two will-nots,” Xi Jinping and Li
Keqiang have deprived themselves of the opportunity to place the
transfer of power on a moral basis. Any reform without a moral
foundation is bound to fail.
Turning Point
The Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee will inadvertently
become a turning point in history. In an attempt to solve the problem of
faction in the Party, the Party’s leaders have abandoned the
possibility of exposing and criticizing the evil the CCP has done.
In denying the fundamental problems the Party faces, the way forward
for the Party becomes so narrow as to be a dead end. The political
situation will have to take a new turn.
The consequences will surface soon. The reforms just launched will
soon run aground, and conflicts will begin to swirl around them. The
factions in the CCP, along with the central and local governments, will
fall into chaotic battles. Chinese society will disintegrate, and the
CCP will begin to dissolve. When the superficial reforms fail, the real
social reforms will begin.
.jpg)
